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Sexual behaviour evidence and evidence of bad character in sexual offence 
proceedings: Proposing a combined admissibility framework.  
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Abstract:  
This article critically evaluates whether the “rape shield” legislation in England and Wales, as 
currently contained in s.41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (YJ&CEA) 1999, is fit for 
purpose. The article addresses the impact of the case of R v Evans (Chedwyn) [2016] EWCA 
Crim 452 which received a disproportionately high amount of media scrutiny and led to 
subsequent calls for greater restrictions on sexual behaviour evidence. The article examines 
possible reform proposals by Findlay Stark and Matt Thomason and the results of empirical 
research conducted by Laura Hoyano before proposing the introduction of a “combined 
admissibility framework” for evidence of a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour and bad 
character. The proposed framework seeks to retain the high threshold for the admissibility, 
in particular, of evidence relating to a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour whilst 
introducing a more holistic and straightforward model moving away from the strict categories 
approach adopted by s.41 YJ&CEA 1999.  
 
Introduction 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Evans (Chedwyn)1 (Evans), and the subsequent 
acquittal of the appellant following retrial in October 2016, received extensive press 
                                                          
1 R v Evans (Chedwyn) [2016] EWCA Crim 452. 
coverage2 and caused a great deal of public concern. The judgment provoked significant and 
high profile criticism and led to unsuccessful attempts to introduce legislative measures, 
comprising, respectively, a Private Member’s Bill3 introduced on the 8th February 2017, and 
an amendment to the Government’s Prisons and Courts Bill introduced on the 23rd March 
20174.  
The proposed legislation would have introduced significant amendments to section 41 Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (YJ&CEA) 1999. The Private Member’s Bill would have 
further restricted the admission of evidence of the complainant’s sexual behaviour with third 
parties.  The proposed amendment to the Prisons and Courts Bill would have made sexual 
behaviour evidence inadmissible under any circumstances.5 The Attorney General’s Office 
and Ministry of Justice subsequently conducted a review into of the use of sexual behaviour 
evidence in over 300 cases6. Ultimately the review concluded that a change in the law was 
unnecessary and that “section 41 is working as intended”7. This finding was subsequently 
supported by empirical research undertaken by Laura Hoyano on behalf of the Criminal Bar 
Association. The research revealed that out of 179 responses from CBA members “[n]ot a 
single respondent (0%) considered that section 41 should be reformed to make it more 
restrictive.”8 
                                                          
2 Sandra Laville, ‘The Ched Evans Trial Showed How Rape Complainants are still Put In The Dock’ The Guardian 
(London, October 14 2016) <www.theguardian.com/society/2016/oct/14/ched-evans-trial-showed-how-
complainants-are-still-put-in-the-dock> accessed 10 October 2019. 
3 Sexual Offences (Amendment) HC Bill (2016-17) [137]. 
4 Prisons and Courts Bill, Notice of Amendments NC1, 23 March 2017 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2016-2017/0145/amend/prisons_rm_pbc_0323.1-2.html> 
accessed 10 October 2019.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Ministry of Justice, Limiting the use of complainants’ sexual history in sex cases (Cm 9547, 2017). 
7 ibid. 3. 
8 Laura Hoyano, The Operation of YJCEA 1999 section 41 in the Courts of England & Wales: views from the 
barristers’ row (Oxford University, 2018) 8; Laura Hoyano, Cross-examination of sexual assault complainants on 
previous sexual behaviour: views from the barristers' row. Crim. L.R. 2019, 2, 77-114. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in the Evans case also prompted significant academic 
debate, including exchanges between McGlynn and Dent & Paul in the Criminal Law Review9 
and other key contributions including by Stark 10  and Thomason 11 . Dent & Paul call for 
recognition of the “progressive and pragmatic nature of s.41” 12  and for proposed 
amendments to “be based on evidence, rather than assumptions…”13. By contrast, McGlynn 
opines that reform of this area of law is “urgently required” and that, ideally, a 
“comprehensive revision of the current law…from first principles”14 is necessary. Despite this, 
the consensus appears to be that the law on sexual behaviour evidence is both a “highly 
controversial” and “extremely (and unnecessarily) complicated area of law.”15  
This article will provide critical insight into the admissibility of evidence of a complainant’s 
previous sexual behaviour under s.41 YJ&CEA 1999. Specific consideration will be given to 
issues raised in Evans to determine whether the case provides an appropriate basis on which 
to propose reforms to the law in this area. The article will also address the broader question 
of whether s.41 strikes an appropriate balance between the protection of complainants from 
unfair and unnecessary cross examination regarding their previous sexual behaviour, and the 
Article 6 ECHR rights of the defendant to a fair trial. The Evans case has been selected for 
particular consideration, in part, because of the disproportionate attention that this case 
                                                          
9 See, Clare McGlynn, 'Rape trials and sexual history evidence: reforming the law on third-party evidence' 
[2017] 81(5) Journal of Criminal Law 367-392; Nick Dent and Sandra Paul, 'In Defence of Section 41' [2017] 8 
Criminal Law Review 613-627; Clare McGlynn, 'Challenging the law on sexual history evidence: a response to 
Dent and Paul' [2018] 3 Criminal Law Review 216-228. 
10 Findlay Stark, Bringing the background to the fore in sexual history evidence [2017] Arch Rev, 8, 4. 
11 Matt J Thomason, Previous sexual history evidence: a gloss on relevance and relationship evidence’ [2018] 
E&P 22(4) 342 
12 Dent and Paul (n 9) 627. 
13 ibid.  
14 Clare McGlynn, 'Rape trials and sexual history evidence: reforming the law on third-party evidence' [2017] 
81(5) Journal of Criminal Law 367, 391. 
15 Clare McGlynn, 'Challenging the law on sexual history evidence: a response to Dent and Paul' [2018] 3 
Criminal Law Review 216, 228. 
received in the context of proposed reforms of s.41 but also because, factually, it has exposed 
some of the deficiencies within the existing s.41 framework.  
Finally, a case will be made for the adoption of an alternative statutory framework which 
departs from the “strict categories” approach to admissibility currently adopted by s.41 
YJ&CEA 1999. The new statutory regime proposes the creation of a combined admissibility 
framework encompassing both sexual history evidence and evidence of the complainant’s 
bad character in sexual offence proceedings. The framework draws not only on the lessons 
learned following the introduction of s.41 but also comparatively on the experiences of other 
jurisdictions in which “rape shield” legislation has been enacted. Further, it seeks to add to 
the contribution made by commentators such as Stark16 and Thomason17 in developing a 
balanced legislative approach to the admissibility and restriction of sexual behaviour evidence.  
 
The Evans case 
In April 2012 Chedwyn “Ched” Evans (Evans) was convicted of rape, and sentenced to 5 years’ 
imprisonment. His co-accused Clayton McDonald (McDonald) was acquitted. The allegation 
arose following sexual activity between the complainant, McDonald and Evans which took 
place at a hotel on the 29th May 2011 whilst the complainant was heavily intoxicated. The 
following day the complainant awoke “naked, alone and confused”,18 with no recollection of 
how she arrived at the hotel. After attempting “to piece together with friends what had 
happened”,19 she eventually contacted the police. The complainant did not allege that she 
                                                          
16 Findlay Stark, Bringing the background to the fore in sexual history evidence [2017] Arch Rev, 8, 4. 
17 Thomason (n 11). 
18 R v Evans (Chedwyn) (n 1)[10]. 
19 R v Evans (Chedwyn) (n 1)[10]. 
had been raped, “Her evidence was simply that she did not remember what happened in 
room 14…”20 All “evidence as to sexual activity in room 14 came solely from [Evans] and 
McDonald themselves.”21 The prosecution case at trial was that, by virtue of her level of 
intoxication, the complainant was not able to give a valid consent to sexual activity with Evans, 
nor could he have formed a reasonable belief in her consent.  
After an unsuccessful appeal in 201222, in 201623 the Criminal Cases Review Commission 
(CCRC) referred the case back to the Court of Appeal following “an in-depth, ten-month long 
investigation”,24 on the basis that fresh evidence had been obtained, “which was not raised 
at trial, and which in the view of the Commission, could have added support to Mr Evan’s 
defence at trial…”25 The evidence in question related to statements from two witnesses, a Mr 
Owens (O) and a Mr Hughes (H), both of whom described engaging in sexual activity with the 
complainant in May and June 2011, which counsel for the appellant described as having 
“striking detail”26 in common with the account given by the appellant. The CCRC considered 
that the evidence of O and H might have been admissible under s.41(3)(c)(i) YJ&CE Act 1999 
because it was relevant to the issue of consent, and was so similar to the sexual behaviour of 
the complainant which took place as part of the subject matter of the charge that the 
similarity could not reasonably be explained as coincidence. The defence sought to adduce 
the evidence on the basis that it supported the veracity of Evans’ account that the 
                                                          
20 R v Evans (Chedwyn) (n 1)[10]. 
21 R v Evans (Chedwyn) (n 1)[11]. 
22 R v Evans [2012] EWCA Crim 2559. 
23 R v Evans (Chedwyn) (n 1). 
24 Criminal Cases Review Commission, 'Commission refers the rape conviction of Ched Evans to the Court of 
Appeal' (5 October 2015); <www.ccrc.gov.uk/commission-refers-the-rape-conviction-of-ched-evans-to-the-
court-of-appeal/> accessed 11 October 2019. 
25 ibid.  
26 R v Evans (Chedwyn) (n 1) [39]. 
complainant, whilst heavily intoxicated, retained the capacity to consent to the sexual activity, 
despite the fact that she retained no memory of it the next day.  
The CCRC further opined that the evidence of the two witnesses might also have been 
admissible under s.41(3)(a) (i.e. that the evidence was relevant to an issue other than consent) 
on the basis that it was relevant to establishing whether the defendant had a reasonable 
belief in consent at the material time. Although this avenue was not seriously pursued on 
appeal, consideration will be given to the relevance of this gateway below.  
It is noted at this early stage that significant criticism may be levelled against the way in 
which the sexual behaviour evidence was obtained, namely following the instruction of 
“professional investigators”,27 and through the offer of a financial reward for anyone who 
could provide evidence relevant to the defence.28 Aside from potential questions about the 
veracity of such evidence, there are three further issues which arise in the context of 
evidence obtained in this manner, in particular in sexual offence cases. First, it is 
inexplicable how such a general, public request for information of this nature is compatible 
with the complainant’s right to anonymity.29 Secondly, a question arises regarding the 
weight of such evidence where, as in the Evans case, the evidence was obtained by the 
promise of a reward. In a different context, Parliament has already recognised that hearsay 
evidence of a complainant is not admissible, ‘if the complaint…was made as a result of a 
threat or a promise’.30 Thirdly, it is unlikely that most defendants would possess the financial 
resources to take such action which may lead to forms of what Baird refers to as “do-it-
                                                          
27 R v Evans (Chedwyn) (n 1) [21]. 
28 Holly Baxter, ‘Justice should never be done like it was in the Ched Evans rape trial’ The Independent, 
(London, 14 October 2016); <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/ched-evans-footballer-rape-trial-
acquitted-justice-woman-misogyny-consent-prison-walk-free-a7362276.html> accessed 10 October 2019. 
29 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, s.1. 
30 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 120(7)(e). 
yourself sleuthing”,31 and which could have a seriously deleterious effect on complainants. 
This concern is supported by the fact that the complainant in Evans was subject to 
disgraceful treatment including receiving significant online threats and abuse, with nine 
people convicted in November 2012 of offences under s.5 of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1992 in respect of publishing the complainant’s identity on social media.32  
Notwithstanding these issues, the Court of Appeal was faced with the existence of potentially 
relevant evidence. Absent an exclusionary discretion,33 the court was therefore required to 
determine the admissibility of such evidence against the existing statutory framework, s.41 
YJ&CE Act 1999.  
 
The admissibility of sexual behaviour evidence under s.41 YJ&CEA 1999 
The admissibility of sexual behaviour evidence gives rise to competing interests in sexual 
offence proceedings. Sexual offence complainants should not be subject to unnecessary 
questioning or cross-examination about their previous sexual conduct. Equally the defence 
must be able to adduce cogent evidence to assist its case particularly where such evidence is 
central to the jury’s understanding of a key element of the case. The enactment of section 41 
of the YJ&CEA 1999 followed extensive criticism of its predecessor, s.2 of the Sexual Offences 
                                                          
31 Vera Baird, ‘We cannot allow the courts to judge rape by sexual history’ The Guardian (London, 17 October 
2016); <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/17/courts-judge-rape-sexual-history-ched-evans-
case> accessed 10 October 2019. 
32 Steven Morris, 'Social media naming of Ched Evans's accuser raises legal questions' The Guardian (London, 
14 October 2016); <www.theguardian.com/law/2016/oct/14/social-media-naming-of-ched-evans-accuser-
raises-questions-law> accessed 10 October 2019 
33 Unlike prosecution evidence which might be excluded under the operation of s.78 Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 the court possesses no discretion to exclude admissible defence evidence on the basis of 
(un)fairness or impropriety in the way in which it was obtained.  
(Amendment) Act 197634, itself introduced following sustained criticism of the common law 
position, near universally condemned for its perceived failure to regulate effectively the 
introduction of sexual behaviour evidence. Often, questions or evidence concerning previous 
sexual conduct served little purpose other than to besmirch the moral character of the 
complainant in the eyes of the jury.35  
The 1976 Act’s replacement, marked a radical departure from its predecessor in two 
respects. First, s.41 of the 1999 Act makes no distinction between evidence of previous 
sexual behaviour between the complainant and the accused and that occurring between the 
complainant and a third party.36 Secondly, the 1999 Act, unlike the 1976 Act, all but 
eradicated judicial discretion to admit sexual behaviour evidence other than that permitted 
through four narrow exceptions. Admissibility is determined through strict gateways that 
have the effect of excluding evidence that does not reach the threshold of admissibility 
under one or more of the exceptions in s.41. This is so even if the evidence is otherwise 
relevant and potentially cogent.37  Like its predecessor, s.41 provoked considerable 
controversy. Initially, however, the criticisms levelled at s.41 were that it swung the balance 
too far in the opposite direction. Where s.2 attracted heavy criticism for being too generous 
to defendants, s.41 was initially described as having surpassed its legislative aim of 
protecting complainants from harassment in the courtroom by excessively curtailing the 
defendant’s right to adduce potentially vital cogent evidence. Indeed, the severity of the 
                                                          
34 Section 2(2) of the 1976 Act provided that evidence of previous sexual behaviour concerning the 
complainant and a third party could be heard in circumstances in which ‘it would be unfair to that defendant 
to refuse to allow the evidence to be adduced or the question to be asked.’ 
35 Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (2nd edn, OUP 2010) 443. 
36 YJ&CEA 1999, 42(1)(c). Evidence of previous sexual behaviour with the accused escaped the clutches of the 
1976 Act. 
37 Lord Steyn exemplified the type of scenario that may give rise to evidence which does not activate s.41 but 
may be relevant; R v A (No.2) [2002] 1 AC 45, 67. 
restrictions imposed by s.41 became the focus of an almost immediate challenge in the 
House of Lords in 200138 (discussed further below). The result was a requirement that s.41 
be interpreted in a manner compliant with Article 6 ECHR. Writing at the time, McEwan 
observed that, ‘it was a fair bet that the amendments to the rape shield comprised in 
section 41 would be an early target for a challenge under Article 6(1)’,39 but for some 
reformers the interpretation of s.41 by their Lordships has rendered the provision difficult 
to apply in practice.40 
Key Gateways to Admissibility 
Section 41(1) sets out the basic prohibition on introducing sexual behaviour evidence:  
If at a trial a person is charged with a sexual offence, then, except with the 
leave of the court – 
(a) no evidence may be adduced, and  
(b) no question may be asked in cross-examination: 
by or on behalf of any accused at the trial, about any sexual behaviour of the 
complainant. 
The four exceptions to this basic prohibition are: (i) ‘the issue is not an issue of consent’;41 
(ii) issues relating to consent and the sexual behaviour to which the question or evidence 
relates took place ‘at or about the same time as the event forming the subject matter of the 
charge’;42 (iii) issues relating to consent and the sexual behaviour occurred in circumstances 
                                                          
38 R v A (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45.  
39 Jenny McEwan, ‘The Rape Shield Askew?’ [2001] E & P 5(4) 257, 257.  
40 Temkin forecast that the decision in R v A (No.2) would be likely ‘to engender a degree of uncertainty’; 
Jennifer Temkin, ’Sexual history evidence – beware the backlash’ [2003] Apr Crim LR 217, 240. 
41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, s 41(3)(a). 
42 ibid s 41(3)(b). 
that are so similar to the sexual behaviour which took place as part of the event,43or any 
other sexual behaviour which took place at or about the same time as that event44 that the 
similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence; and (iv) a gateway which affords 
the defendant an opportunity to rebut assertions made by the prosecution.45  
Only (iii) – and to a lesser extent (i) – were relevant in the context of the Evans decision. The 
relevance of both (i) and (iii) will, therefore, be considered below. It is important to stress 
that having satisfied one (or more) of the s.41 exceptions, this does not, on its own, 
guarantee that the evidence will be admitted. Additional restrictions or ‘hurdles’ must be 
surmounted. The evidence or questioning must constitute a specific instance of the 
complainant’s previous sexual behaviour;46 must not be adduced where the purpose (or 
main purpose) is to impugn the complainant’s credibility as a witness’ 47 and finally, the 
judge must not allow the evidence to be heard unless a refusal to do so ‘might have the 
result of rendering unsafe a conclusion of the jury or (as the case may be) the court on any 
relevant issue in the case.’48 Collectively and on a literal interpretation, the s.41 exceptions 
and restrictions constitute very difficult hurdles to negotiate before evidence of the 
complainant’s sexual behaviour can be heard.  
McGlynn acknowledges that, whilst it might occasionally be necessary to adduce sexual 
history evidence, ‘it has been demonstrated that many unnecessarily intrusive questions 
have been asked of complainants, often as a matter of routine; potentially therefore, in 
                                                          
43 ibid s 41(3)(c)(i). 
44 ibid s 41(3)(c)(ii). 
45 ibid s 41(5). 
46 Ibid s 41(6). 
47 Ibid s 41(4). 
48 Ibid s 41(2)(b). A relevant issue in the case is defined in s 42(1)(a) as ‘any issue falling to be proved by the 
prosecution or defence in the trial of the accused’. 
breach of the complainant’s Article 8 rights’.49 This echoes the comments of Lord Hutton in 
R v A (No.2) itself, which, whilst not specifically framed in terms of Article 8 rights, highlights 
additional considerations in rape trials which go beyond ensuring that the guilty are 
convicted and the innocent are not. He makes reference to a ‘third objective’50 to ensure 
that complainants are treated with dignity in court and that irrelevant evidence or question 
is prohibited. It is clear that complainants in sexual offence cases are not only asked to 
recount, but are also scrutinised about, traumatic experiences that they otherwise might 
not choose to share, particularly in the public environment of a courtroom. As Baird 
observes, 'complainants in sexual violence cases give evidence as a public duty in the 
interests of the community [but] sexual violence cases are often treated as if they are trials 
between the complainant and defendant personally'.51  
Whilst it is not disputed that complainants have endured appalling treatment in the form of 
irrelevant and excessive cross-examination about their sexual histories, some of the 
humiliation and distress suffered in court may be unavoidable if the questioning can be 
attributed to relevant evidence which, if excluded, would affect the defendant’s rights under 
Article 6 ECHR.52 The need for a careful balance to be struck between the legitimate 
protection of complainants and the right of the accused to a fair trial is therefore 
paramount. After all, Temkin suggested that, ‘the primary purpose of rape shield legislation 
                                                          
49 Clare McGlynn, ‘Commentary on R v A (No 2)’ in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley 
(eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Hart Publishing 2010). 
50 R v A (No.2) (n 38) 98 (Lord Hutton). 
51 Vera Baird, Sir John Gillen Review of Sexual Offences in Northern Ireland: Consultation Response of Dame 
Vera Baird QC, Northumbria PCC (23 January 2019) <http://www.northumbria-pcc.gov.uk/v2/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/Northumbria-OPCC-response-to-Sir-John-GIllen-Review-of-Sexual-Offences.pdf> 
accessed 10 October 2019. 
52 In particular, Article 6(3)(d) provides that ‘[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence has the right [...] to 
examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses 
on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him’.  
is not to save the blushes of the complainant. It is to exclude evidence that is of little or no 
relevance and which serves only to distract the jury from the issues in the trial’.53 In R v A 
(No.2), Lord Steyn suggested that, in drafting s.41 of the 1999 Act, ‘the legislature would not 
[...] have wished to deny the right to an accused to put forward a full and complete defence 
by advancing truly probative material’54 recognising that some evidence may “nevertheless 
[be] so relevant to the issue of consent that to exclude it would endanger the fairness of the 
trial’.55  
The application of the s.41 gateways in R v Evans  
Two s.41 exception(s) aroused particular controversy in Evans – the ‘similarity’ exception 
contained in s.41(3)(c) of the 1999 Act and the non-consent gateway in s.41(3)(a) which, 
despite not being given detailed consideration in Evans, was recognised as a potential route 
to admissibility. Section 41(3)(c) of the 1999 Act applies where the issue is consent and the 
sexual behaviour of the complainant to which the evidence or question relates is alleged to 
have been, in any respect, so similar— 
(i) to any sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to evidence 
adduced or to be adduced by or on behalf of the accused) took place as part 
of the event which is the subject matter of the charge against the accused, or 
(ii) to any other sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to such 
evidence) took place at or about the same time as that event: 
that the similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence. 
                                                          
53 Temkin, ‘Sexual History Evidence: Beware the Backlash’ [2003] Apr Crim LR 217, 239. 
54 R v A (No.2) (n 38) [68] (Lord Steyn). 
55 R v A (No.2) (n 38) [69] (Lord Steyn). 
McGlynn has objected to the inclusion of a ‘similar facts’ exception based on the same 
principles that govern the admissibility of the defendant’s bad character, arguing that ‘such 
principles cannot be extrapolated to situations of sexual activity and consent, where 
consent is given afresh to each person and on each occasion’.56 On this point, it is difficult to 
disagree with Lord Steyn in R v A (No.2) who remarked: 
It is true that each decision to engage in sexual activity is always made afresh. 
On the other hand…[w]hat one has been engaged on in the past may influence 
what choice one makes on a future occasion.57 
Although some appeals, Evans being an example, arise due to the availability of fresh 
evidence, cases are still reaching the Court of Appeal on the back of alleged misapplications 
of s.41. 58 The test outlined by Lord Steyn in R v A (No.2 ) 59 has provided guidance to judges 
where unfairness might otherwise result, but problems with the application of the 
legislative provisions nevertheless remain.  The amended Criminal Practice Directions 201560 
should help to ensure that the correct process is followed when applications are made to 
adduce sexual behaviour evidence.61 However, controversy still surrounds the restrictive 
                                                          
56 McGlynn, ‘Commentary on R v A (No 2)’ (n 49) 
57 R v A (No.2) (n 38) 62 (Lord Steyn). 
58 See for example: Armando Andrade v R [2015] EWCA Crim 1722 in which the trial judge appeared to favour a 
strict interpretation of s.41 without recourse to the considerations raised in R v A (No 2) (n 38); R v RP [2013] 
EWCA Crim 2331 concerning the meaning of ‘sexual behaviour’ in s.42(1)(c) of the 1999 Act; T v R [2012] EWCA 
Crim 2358 in which the court made no reference to the ‘unsafe conclusion test’ contained in s.41(2)(b) which 
provides that evidence falling within s.41(3) or (5) can be admitted only if a refusal to do ‘might have the result 
of rendering unsafe a conclusion of the jury or (as the case may be) the court on any relevant issue in the 
case’; R v Gjoni (Kujtim) [2014] EWCA Crim 691 concerning s.41(3)(a) pertaining to the defendant’s ‘reasonable 
belief’ that the complainant consented; R v W [2014] EWCA Crim 545 concerning the credibility of the 
complainant in relation to previous false allegations and the overlap between s.41 and s.100 if the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003; R v Salaam David All Hilly [2014] EWCA Crim 1614, concerning the application of the 
evidential basis test as it applies in the context of false allegations. These examples represent only a fraction of 
the appeals concerning s.41 since it was enacted.  
59 R v A (No.2) (n 38) 69 (Lord Steyn). 
60 Criminal Practice Directions 2015: (Amendment No.6) [2018] EWCA Crim 516. 
61 The sixth amendment to the Criminal Practice Directions (CPD) 2015, supplementing the Criminal Procedure 
(Amendment) Rules 2018 SI 2018/132 came into force on 2nd April 2018. CPD 22A provides detailed guidance 
concerning the handling of applications under s.41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 
nature of the legislation itself, reinforcing Birch’s view that, ‘it was always on the cards that 
[s.41] amounted to “legislative overkill”’.62  
A key objection raised by McGlynn about the Evans decision concerns the perceived liberal 
interpretation of the similarity exception where, arguably, the complainant’s behaviour did 
not amount to conduct that was deemed to be ‘so’ similar as to be not coincidental.63 The 
evidence was that C had consumed alcohol; instigated sexual activity; directed her partner 
into certain position and used specific words of encouragement and, according to Evans, at 
the original trial was ‘enthusiastic, awake and gave no indication that she was not capable of 
consenting’.64 When considered in isolation it is difficult to disagree with McGlynn who 
suggests that ‘the everyday can constitute sufficiently similar behaviour’65 A more forceful 
argument could be advanced for admissibility when a holistic approach to the evidence is 
taken. With this in mind it was, perhaps, a culmination of similarities, each in themselves 
unlikely to satisfy the threshold for admissibility but together able to surpass it.66 Moreover, 
the Court of Appeal acknowledged that, whist ‘it may be a rare case, as Lord Steyn 
envisaged in A (No.2) in which it will be appropriate to indulge in…forensic examination of 
sexual behaviour with others’,67 this was ‘potentially such a rare case’68  
Sexual behaviour evidence and reasonable belief in consent  
                                                          
62 Dianne Birch, ‘Rethinking Sexual History: Proposals for Fairer Trials’ [2002] Jul Crim LR Jul 531, quoting Lord 
Steyn in R v A (No.2) (n 38) 67. 
63 Clare McGlynn, (n 15) 218. 
64 R v Evans (Chedwyn) (n 1) [13]. 
65 Clare McGlynn, (n 15) 218. 
66 Dispelling the Rape Myths: An Evaluation of S.41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 in Light 
of Recent Reform Proposals, 6 UK L. Student Rev. 1 (2018) 13. 
67 R v Evans (Chedwyn) (n 1) [74]. 
68 Ibid. 
In Evans, it was suggested by the CCRC that the evidence could potentially have been 
admitted under s.41(3)(a) on the basis that it was relevant to E’s reasonable belief that X 
consented.69 Section 41(3)(a) of the 1999 Act isolates the relevant issue as one that does not 
involve ‘consent’. Section 42(1)(b) defines ‘issue of consent’ as: 
any issue whether the complainant in fact consented to the conduct constituting the 
offence with which the accused is charged (and accordingly does not include any 
issue as to the belief of the accused that the complainant so consented). 
Temkin has criticised this distinction as having the potential to ‘create a substantial loophole 
in the law’,70 arguing that ‘on one view, whenever consent is in issue in a sexual case, it is 
accompanied by that of belief in consent’.71 Although concerns have been raised that 
s.41(3)(a) ‘is a potentially broad exception, with creative defence teams reframing evidence 
to admit it under this provision’,72 the Court of Appeal has displayed reluctance to depart 
from a strict interpretation of the exception. For example, in Bahador,73 the appellant 
argued that his belief in consent arose from the complainant’s earlier sexually explicit 
behaviour on a nightclub stage but the Court adhered to a strict interpretation of the s.41 
leave requirements and in particular the ‘unsafe’ test in s.41(2)(b).74 The Court highlighted 
the significance of further evidence in the form of a positive response given by the 
appellant’s friend when asked by the appellant if the complainant ‘was up for it.’75 This, the 
Court observed, had far more impact on the appellant’s mind-set and belief regarding the 
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complainant’s willingness to consent than that made by the complainant’s earlier conduct in 
the nightclub. In this respect, Bahador appears to support the contention that the courts 
will not give leave readily under the subsection, and that judges ‘approach the question of 
relevance and admissibility thoughtfully’.76 However, what makes the potential application 
of s.41(3)(a) unusual in Evans is the fact that at the time of engaging in the relevant sexual 
activity Evans was unaware of X’s  sexual behaviour with H or with O, with one such instance 
taking place after the sexual activity which formed the basis of the complaint in Evans. As 
the decision of the Court of Appeal in Bahador indicates, it is usually knowledge of the 
complainant’s previous sexual behaviour which the defendant will (attempt to) argue has 
informed his reasonable belief in the complainant’s consent at the time of the alleged 
sexual activity.   
McGlynn and Thomason both argue that sexual behaviour evidence could never be relevant 
to the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief in consent if the defendant had no prior 
knowledge of the evidence.77 Thomason further suggests that lack of knowledge means that 
the evidence ‘logically could have had no bearing whatsoever on their state of mind at the 
time of the sexual contact in question.’78 Whilst the evidence provided by O and H could not 
have affected Evans’s state of mind because it was fresh evidence and not available at the 
original trial, its significance derives from the fact that two independent witnesses came 
forward to provide similar accounts of sexual activity with C that mirrored Evans’s account, 
an account which, as a result of her impaired memory, was not subject to a contrary 
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account given by C. As Stark suggests, whilst the evidence of O and H does not confirm 
whether Evans’s belief in consent was reasonable - this relied on his appreciation of C’s 
capacity to consent - O’s evidence, at the very least, demonstrates that C could give an 
impression to sexual partners that she was capable of consenting to sexual activity which 
she later had no recollection of.79 The question posed is thus: in the absence of a contrary 
account offered by C, does C’s previous sexual behaviour with O, which to O’s surprise C had 
no recollection of, support Evans’s account that he reasonably believed that C was 
consenting? This is of particular relevance given that the reasonableness or otherwise of 
Evans’s belief appears to depend on the jury’s acceptance of the veracity of his account.  
In the context of s.41(3)(c), Thomason makes a strong case for suggesting that ‘Evans should 
be considered as an ECHR gloss case, rather than a similarity one’.80 This approach should 
allay fears that the Evans decision opens the ‘floodgates’81 for the admissibility of sexual 
behaviour evidence through the similarity gateway. As Mirfield noted, ‘what can be done to 
section 41(3)(c) can also be done to any other element of section 41 deemed capable of 
denying the accused his fair trial right’.82 Thus, given the absence of a contrary account to 
the version of events presented by Evans, it is not difficult to see how exclusion of O’s 
evidence, as it relates to E’s reasonable belief in consent, ‘might have the result of rendering 
unsafe a conclusion of the jury’83  
 
Admissibility of third party sexual behaviour evidence 
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Section 41 does not discriminate between third party sexual behaviour evidence and that 
occurring between the complainant and defendant.84 Whilst Thomason suggests that this 
represents an ‘unintended oversight’ 85 by the legislators, the specific wording, ‘whether or 
not involving any accused or other person’ clearly implies a deliberate intention by 
Parliament that both categories should be subject to the admissibility framework created by 
s.41. McGlynn cites Mukadi86 as an example of the ‘entirely disconnected sexual activity 
with third parties [that] can be adduced in evidence’87 The evidence in Mukadi, which had 
been refused by the trial judge, consisted of an earlier incident which involved the 
complainant standing on Oxford Street before getting into a car and driving off with an 
unknown man who was much older than her, and with whom she had exchanged phone 
numbers.  It is not disputed that this decision demonstrated a liberal interpretation of s.41 
and is ‘hard to justify’.88 As Page and Birch suggest, even if the complainant was open to the 
idea of engaging in sexual activity with a third party in the earlier incident, ‘it by no means 
follows that she found M an equally pleasing prospect’.89 There are suggestions that the 
complainant’s earlier conduct did not amount to ‘sexual behaviour’90 and therefore should 
not have engaged s.41. The Court of Appeal merely commented that that the evidence 
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should have been admitted ‘whatever label one attaches to the conduct’,91 because its 
exclusion may have led the jury to take a different view of the complainant’s evidence on 
the issue of whether she had consented to full intercourse with the defendant. This leaves 
open the question of what types of behaviour can or cannot be labelled as ‘sexual’ so as to 
engage s.41 and serves as another example of s.41’s vagueness and complexity. However, as 
discussed above, to suggest that Mukadi sets a benchmark for s.41’s conventional 
application is misleading. In his comprehensive review of the law and procedure which 
governs the prosecution of sexual offences in Northern Ireland, Sir John Gillen disagreed 
that third party sexual behaviour evidence should never be admitted,92 suggesting instead 
that, 'stricter scrutiny should be applied for applications for such third party evidence and it 
should be considered admissible only in relatively few cases.' 93  
Section 41 departs significantly from its predecessor by subjecting sexual behaviour 
evidence to strict categories of admissibility. This approach stands in stark contrast to the 
approach of the 1976 Act, which afforded wide discretion to trial judges to admit evidence, 
not merely based on similarity. It is perhaps for this reason that Lord Steyn posited:  
Evidence or questions about sexual behaviour with third parties is likely to be much 
harder to justify on grounds of relevancy than evidence about sexual behaviour with 
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the defendant. Nevertheless I think that the draftsman was right to avoid laying 
down an absolute rule on this point.94 
Viewed as such, the value of the evidence adduced in Evans derives from the fact that two 
independent witnesses – unconnected to Evans (and of whose behaviour Evans had no 
knowledge) subsequently provided similar accounts of consensual sexual activity with C and 
of which C retained no memory afterwards. McGlynn argues that previous instances in 
which consent was given are not indicative of future consent. This is compounded by the 
emergence of “rape myths” which, in many common law jurisdictions, have required 
statutory intervention to attempt to prevent their proliferation and to switch the focal point 
of the trial from the character of the complainant to the alleged wrongful conduct of the 
accused.95  
Birch had previously warned against the dangers of excluding potentially probative material, 
and remarked that, ‘we need to think of ways of taking the jury into the light, rather than 
deliberately keeping them in the dark’.96 Sexual behaviour evidence might, therefore, have 
considerable value as explanatory evidence, and should, therefore, be made available to 
assist juries so that the potential for wrongful convictions can be avoided. This, of course, 
assumes that sexual behaviour evidence is adduced for ‘legitimate purposes’,97 and not 
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merely deployed as a mechanism through which to tarnish the complainant’s moral 
character in the eyes of the jury.98 In the context of Evans, as Dent and Paul make clear: 
…it was not suggested that the evidence of the complainant’s sexual behaviour 
meant that she could not be believed. Instead, it was simply suggested that the 
evidence in question was relevant as to whether she had consented to the 
intercourse—and the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that she had 
consented to the intercourse. The complainant’s evidence was that she could not 
remember what had happened and the prosecution’s case was that she did not 
consent. The complainant’s credibility was not in question. 
As the Court of Appeal identified “When the defendant was first asked what happened in 
room 14, he described in graphic detail the sexual behaviour of a woman who, on the 
prosecution case, would have been incapable of behaving in that way.”99 Thus, the veracity, 
or otherwise, of Evans’ account became a central question for a jury being asked to 
determine whether the complainant retained sufficient capacity to consent, whether she in 
fact consented, and the reasonableness (or otherwise) of Evans’ belief in the complainant’s 
consent. The relevance of the third party sexual behaviour evidence was therefore in 
respect of the veracity of the defendant’s account, and not the complainant’s credibility. It is 
contended that without reference to the evidence of O and H the jury would have been 
unable to reach safe conclusions on these issues. 
Does the decision in Evans set a dangerous precedent? 
The Evans decision has been described as a ‘throwback to the last century when women 
who reported rape were assumed to be lying and their sex life was on trial’.100 In the 
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aftermath of the decision, particular concerns were voiced that the decision sets a 
precedent, paving the way for future courts to adopt a more defendant-generous 
interpretation of s.41. Dent and Paul have attempted to allay fears, arguing that ‘the 
floodgates have not – and will not be opened',101 however, McGlynn suggests that the 
decision ‘does not simply open the “floodgates’ but risks a tsumani (sic).’102 As discussed 
above, Mukadi103 is often cited as evidence to support claims that sexual behaviour 
evidence, ‘continues to be admitted in a considerable number of trials.’104 Several recent 
empirical studies undertaken in this area appear to have reached contrary conclusions.105   
These findings, including that that the introduction of sexual behaviour evidence by the 
defence is exceptional,106 seem to provide cogent evidence that s.41 sets a high bar for 
defendants to surmount. As the Court of Appeal in Evans observed:  
It was an unusual case. The only witnesses as to sexual activity and the only evidence 
as to sexual activity came from the accused. Unlike McDonald, the defendant [Evans] 
could rely on little more than his own account of events in the bedroom to advance 
his defence of capacity to consent and actual consent. X could not assist; she said 
she remembered nothing.107 
It is, therefore, difficult to support an argument that the Evans determination holds much in 
the way of precedent value, given the particular facts of the case, and the specific relevance 
of the sexual behaviour evidence being adduced.  
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Does the decision in Evans provide a case for legislative reform?  
Despite that fact that the decision in Evans appears to have limited precedent value, the 
case clearly highlights concerns that the current approach to the restriction (and admission) 
of sexual behaviour evidence is not fit for purpose. McGlynn’s criticism that this is “an 
extremely (and unnecessarily) complicated area of law”108 appears to be a valid one. The 
rigidity of the ‘strict categories’ approach to admissibility, the uncertainty of how to read 
the categories in a convention compliant manner (as required by the decision in R v A 
(No.2)), combined with the application of the unsafe conclusion test make the provisions of 
s.41 difficult to apply with any degree of certainty, thus leaving the provisions vulnerable to 
criticism from both sides of the argument.  
The challenge for any new legislative approach (for example based on a departure from the 
strict categories approach to sexual behaviour evidence) is to successfully balance the 
interests of sexual offence complainants and defendants. This is demonstrated by the 
criticism of the current s.41 regime, simultaneously lambasted for being both too 
restrictive109 and not restrictive enough.110 The difficulty encountered by various 
jurisdictions has been achieving the correct balance. Given the polarising views in this area 
of the law, it is clear that ‘what one sees as common sense, another sees as nonsense’.111 It 
is surely axiomatic that complainants must not be unduly harassed in the courtroom, and 
should be able to give their best evidence, however a strict categories approach for 
assessing relevance is flawed if, as is the case with s.41, such an approach has the potential 
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to violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Similarly, it is flawed in equipoise if it allows 
the admission of the very type of evidence it was enacted to restrict.  
Against this backdrop, Canada experienced similar problems after amendments were made 
to its first ‘rape shield’ statute.112 The changes incorporated a pigeonholed approach to 
admitting sexual behaviour evidence.113  The Canadian rape shield legislation was redrafted 
in light of the decision in Seaboyer,114 however the UK Parliament decided to persevere with 
s.41 in England and Wales despite it being subject to a similar challenge, shortly after its 
enactment, in the form of R v A (No.2).115  
The Scottish Government, when undertaking a review of its rape shield laws, published a 
pre-legislative consultation document in 2000,116 which put forward a number of 
recommendations in which the rape shield might be strengthened. This exercise resulted in 
the replacement of ss.274 and 275 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 by the 
Sexual Offences (Procedure and Evidence) (Scotland) Act 2002. This was an example of, 
‘second wave of rape shield legislation sweeping the world in response to the perceived 
failure of most initial attempts to operate as intended’.117 It is interesting, however, that 
Scotland decided not to follow the s.41 model, considering it to be ‘too inflexible’.118  
Options for reform 
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Stark has proposed a replacement for s.41 that would provide for the admissibility of sexual 
behaviour evidence only where ‘if the evidence were not admitted or the question not 
asked, the jury or (as the case may be) the court would find it impossible or difficult properly 
to understand other evidence in the case, and the evidence or question's value for 
understanding the case as a whole is substantial.’ 119 A number of further factors are then 
listed which the court should consider before the evidence is heard such as: ‘the time 
between the relevant sexual behaviour and the activities that form the basis of the offence’ 
and ‘any significant similarities between the relevant sexual behaviour and the activities that 
form the basis of the offence…’ 120 Stark recognises the potential significance of sexual 
behaviour evidence in terms of its explanatory value in much the same way bad character 
evidence is admissible through s.100(1)(a) and s.101(1)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003.121 McGlynn might criticise such an approach,  based on the assumption that consent is 
made afresh on each occasion of sexual activity, though it is difficult to disagree with Birch 
who observed, ‘logically, evidence of sexual history may have explanatory value, in just the 
same way as evidence of the bad character of the accused or of a witness’. 122  
Whilst sexual behaviour evidence can be indirectly relevant to an issue in the proceedings - 
which, in the context of evidence concerning a non-defendant’s character, is the approach 
taken by s.100(1)(a) of the CJA 2003 in terms of its value as important explanatory evidence 
– it can also be directly relevant. It is on this basis that Thomason identifies an apparent gap 
in Stark’s proposed provision. Section 41(3) YJCEA 1999 stipulates that the 1999 Act applies 
‘if the evidence or question relates to a relevant issue in the case’, which s.42(1)(a) defines 
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as ‘any issue falling to be proved by the prosecution or defence in the trial of the accused.’ 
Thus, the relevant issue can be consent under ss.41(3)(b) and (c) or, as provided for by 
s.41(3)(a), an issue other than consent (which includes evidence of the defendant’s 
reasonable belief in consent). So, whilst Stark’s provision would remove many of s.41’s 
complexities, it appears that only evidence which is capable of providing context to the jury 
would be admissible. As Thomason suggests, perhaps the best answer is a wholesale rewrite 
of s.41;123 however, no substantive alternative is suggested to address the omissions in 
Stark’s proposal. What is needed is a new provision which not only remedies that gap but 
also departs from the model upon which s.41 is based which has rendered it an inherently 
complex piece of legislation, with ambiguous terminology.124 The new statutory framework, 
proposed herein, draws upon the experiences of a number of common law jurisdictions 
including Scotland which decided not to adopt the s.41 model during subsequent reforms of 
its rape shield laws.  
Thomason draws parallels between the admissibility of sexual behaviour evidence under 
s.41 and bad character evidence under s.100 of the CJA 2003 on the basis that both involve 
the admissibility of evidence concerning past conduct to infer some aspect of present 
behaviour. Although Thomason acknowledges that the complex machinery of the s.41 
gateways and restrictions do not compare favourably with the more flexible 'substantial 
probative value' exception in s.100(1)(b) of the 2003 Act, further difficulties would 
potentially arise if the test for admitting sexual behaviour evidence mirrored the 
admissibility threshold provided by the  “character model” in s.100 CJA 2003. Section 
112(3)(b) of the CJA 2003 expressly provides that nothing in the Act ‘affects the exclusion of 
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evidence’ under s.41 of the YJ&CEA 1999. Similarly, s.41(8) of the 1999 Act provides that, 
‘[n]othing in this section authorises any evidence to be adduced or any question to be asked 
which cannot be adduced or asked apart from this section’. Using the ‘enhanced relevance 
test’ contained in s.100(1)(b) as an example, this test amounts to a less onerous threshold 
for admissibility than the ‘unsafe conclusion test’ in s.41(2)(b) of the 1999 Act.125 Indeed, 
where both s.41 and s.100 apply, for example, where there is evidence that the complainant 
has falsely claimed previous sexual behaviour was non-consensual, and thereby potentially 
amounting to evidence of the complainant's character, the more burdensome obstacle 
confronting any application to adduce the evidence will be s.41.126 Indeed, the Law 
Commission has said, if s.41 is satisfied then it is inconceivable that the evidence will not 
satisfy the requirements of s.100.127 
Thomason suggests that it would be simpler if each admissibility regime at least used the 
same operative concepts,128 however there would be serious concerns about applying the 
same test for the admissibility of sexual behaviour evidence as that applied for character 
evidence under s.100 of the 2003 Act. By moving to the s.100 model, admissibility of sexual 
behaviour evidence would be assessed by way of its, 'substantial probative value' rather 
than the higher hurdle faced by defendants under s.41. Given that the current law is 
castigated for allowing too much sexual behaviour evidence into the courtroom under the 
higher test in s.41 - despite recent empirical evidence suggesting the contrary129 – there is 
clearly little appetite for moving to the s.100 admissibility threshold such as that advanced 
by Stark. Thomason has explored the possibility of adding a new gateway to s.41, akin to 
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s.100(1)(a), to accommodate relationship evidence, but recognises that additional gateways 
would merely compound s.41’s complexity.130 Kibble noted the possibility of adding further 
exceptions to s.41, such as providing for motive to fabricate; prior false allegations; and 
evidence of prior sexual history with the defendant.131 However, he also observed that while 
open-ended rules are not the answer, neither are rules which permit only mechanical 
application and do not permit trial judges to exercise judgment’.132 Rather than move the 
admissibility threshold of sexual behaviour evidence to a s.100 type model, any new 
legislative framework should retain the same higher test of admissibility that currently exists 
under s.41, but which operates in a way that is easier to apply in practice. 
 
The overlap between s.41 of the 1999 Act and s.100 of the 2003 Act 
The spectre of false allegations of sexual assault has given rise to a number of rape myths 
that are based on a general distrust of sexual offence complainants. Section 41(4) of the 
1999 Act is designed to protect complainants from irrelevant and humiliating questioning, 
and to safeguard against the twin myths which might suggest that previous sexual 
behaviour was indicative both of consent and lack of credibility.133 But whilst section 41 
places heavy restrictions on the defendant’s freedom to ask questions about the 
complainant’s previous sexual behaviour, a distinction is currently drawn between questions 
about previous sexual behaviour, which fall under the Act, and questions relating to the 
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complainant’s lies about sexual matters, which do not. Unlike rape shield legislation enacted 
in some other jurisdictions,134  section 41 does not cater for the admissibility of evidence 
concerning the complainant’s character.135 Rather, where the defence wishes to adduce 
evidence of or question the complainant about previous false allegations, leave will be 
required under s.100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 if this amounts to evidence of the 
complainant’s bad character.136 However, there is potential for s.41 and s.100 to overlap 
where the previous complaint, which is allegedly false, involves an allegation concerning the 
complainant’s sexual behaviour. 
It was decided in R v T; MH,137 that as far as s.41 is concerned, questions or evidence 
regarding a sexual offence complainant’s previous false statements are not questions about 
the ‘sexual behaviour’ of the complainant because they relate not to the complainant’s 
previous sexual behaviour but to past statements regarding such behaviour.138 Moreover, 
the courts have concluded that where the defendant does not have such an evidential basis 
for the suggestion that a previous complaint was false, the proposed evidence or 
questioning will be regarded as a cynical attempt to elicit sexual behaviour evidence. 
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Essentially, this means that the evidence or questioning will fall foul of s.41(4) of the 1999 
Act. It is for this reason that defence counsel must obtain a ruling from the judge that s.41 
does not prohibit questions put to a complainant regarding alleged previous false 
complaints. As Keene LJ observed in R v T; MH, the judge is entitled to seek assurances from 
the defence that it has a proper basis for asserting that the statement was made and was 
untrue’.139  
Of course, such evidence is now subject to an enhanced relevance test in s.100 of the 2003 
Act  which would not have applied at the time of the R v T;MH decision. Thus, if the defence 
does not have sufficiently probative material to satisfy an evidential basis for suggesting that 
the previous complaint is false, the material will not have ‘substantial probative value in 
relation to a matter which [...] is a matter in issue in the proceedings and [...] is of substantial 
importance in the context of the case as a whole’.140 
It is conceivable that in a sexual offence trial where the complainant has made false 
allegations in the past, either s.41 (if the evidential basis test is not satisfied) or s.100 (if the 
evidence amounts to evidence of the complainant’s bad character) might be brought into 
play, or the circumstances of the case might require the deployment of both provisions, or, 
indeed, as will be demonstrated below, of neither. In R v V Crane J suggested that ‘cross-
examination about an allegedly false sexual offence allegation may require a ruling in 
relation to section 41 as well as leave under s.100. In many cases section 41 will be the more 
formidable obstacle to overcome’.141 Further support for the proposition that s.41 
constitutes a more onerous provision is provided by the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of 
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s.100(1)(b) in R v Brewster.142 This has been described as a ‘significant but unsatisfactory 
judgment’143 because the court gave a liberal interpretation concerning the types of 
previous convictions having ‘substantial probative value’ for the purpose of s.100(1)(b). 
Pitchford LJ remarked that: 
[t]he question is whether the evidence of previous convictions, or bad behaviour, 
is sufficiently persuasive to be worthy of consideration by a fair-minded tribunal 
upon the issue of the witness’s creditworthiness.144 
Notwithstanding the relaxed approach in Brewster, where the imputation is that the 
complainant has made false allegations in the past, defence counsel should be cautious that 
the line of questioning does not engage the leave requirements of s.41 of the 1999 Act.  
Where issues of credibility arise in circumstances in which s.41 applies it must be 
remembered that, in line with Parliament’s intended aim of not perpetuating the myth that 
unchaste women are less likely to constitute credible witnesses, s.41(4) provides for a ban 
on attacking the complainant’s credibility where this is ‘the purpose (or main purpose)’ of 
the cross-examination. Thus, unless the accused can show that the purpose or main purpose 
of the cross-examination was not to discredit the witness, which might be difficult for the 
court to determine in a sexual assault trial where the distinction between issue and 
credibility can become blurred, the evidence will be deemed inadmissible under section 
41(4). This assumes that the questioning relates to the complainant’s previous sexual 
behaviour and not merely that the complainant’s lies, which would engage only s.100.  
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The following scenario illustrates one possible approach that may be taken by the courts. 
The defendant (D) wishes to cross-examine the complainant (C) about a previous allegation 
of rape made by C, which D has some evidential foundation for suggesting was false in 
circumstances in which the 2003 Act’s definition of bad character is engaged. Keene LJ laid 
down a requirement in R v T;MH that, “[t]he defence, wishing to put questions about 
alleged previous false complaints, will need to seek a ruling from the judge that section 41 
does not exclude them.” 145 Given Crane J’s interpretation of R v T;MH in R v V that s.41 
does not apply if the questioning ‘goes to the lies rather than to the sexual behaviour 
itself’,146 it is conceivable that the court could grant leave under s.100 on the credibility 
issue on the basis that C has made previous false allegations, but refuse D’s application 
under s.41 to cross-examine C on the sexual behaviour aspects surrounding the lie. This 
seems a logical approach given the effect of s.41(4) in restricting D’s ability to discredit the 
complainant, and s.100 allowing D to discredit C on the alleged lie. Aside from the obvious 
dissonance, the way in which the two sections can potentially overlap is unsatisfactory, and 
arises because of s.41’s inability to cater for the various contexts in which false allegations 
might be made. Thus any statutory replacement for s.41 should cater for the admissibility of 
evidence concerning the complainant’s character, as well as evidence concerning the 
complainant’s sexual behaviour.  
Since the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the extent to which complainants can 
be questioned about false allegations is determined by an awkward overlap of provisions in 
the 2003 and 1999 Acts (s.100 of the 2003 Act also, effectively, incorporating an evidential 
basis test). As has been identified the s.100 admissibility test will, potentially, be the 
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governing provision in false allegation scenarios in which the evidential basis test is satisfied, 
whereas in circumstances where cross-examination is concerned with the complainant’s 
sexual behaviour, s.41 is likely to determine whether the accused is granted leave, whether 
or not the more generous s.100 test is applicable. What is clear is that the overlap between 
these two provisions continues to cause confusion. The unsatisfactory state of affairs 
surrounding the overlap between the two provisions is illustrated by the following 
commentary:  
Although bad character evidence strictly falls outside the ambit of the YJCEA, in 
the context of trials of sexual offences it will normally constitute material of the 
kind with which section 41 is primarily concerned: sexual behaviour having an 
adverse bearing upon the complainant’s credibility. This is, of course an 
ambiguous area since the circumstances will naturally vary from one case to the 
next. However, statutory reform to remedy this issue could fall foul of the same 
criticism as met section 41: that trying to fit particular cases into predetermined, 
exhaustive categories of relevancies is not feasible. The problems cast up by the 
provision are capable of being remedied, therefore, not by statutory revision but 
rather by additional guidelines.147 
Three observations can be made in light of these remarks. First, whilst recognising the 
differing circumstances in which false allegations might arise, the authors of the quotation 
assume that ‘normally’ bad character evidence in sexual offence trials will encompass the 
type of material that s.41 was designed to exclude, namely sexual history evidence. This 
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assertion seems erroneous, because it appears that s.41 will not bite where the rationale for 
adducing the evidence is to elicit the falsity of a previous complaint and nothing else. This 
has seemingly been confirmed by the Court of Appeal in its interpretation of R v T;MH and 
in R v V  where it was suggested that s.41 would not be engaged if the cross-examination 
‘goes to the lies rather than to the sexual behaviour itself’.148  
Second, the authors refer to a fundamental criticism of s.41  that ‘trying to fit particular 
cases into predetermined, exhaustive categories of relevancies is not feasible’. On this point, 
however, a strict categories approach to admitting evidence is just one of a number of 
statutory models. This article advocates it is possible to cater for the admissibility of both 
sexual history and character evidence through more logical means than those which are 
provided for at present in the cumbersome overlap between the 1999 and 2003 Acts, 
namely in the form of a combined admissibility framework. 
 Finally, it is submitted that the implementation of a new rape shield statute, which departs 
from a strict categories approach to admitting evidence, is not necessarily bound to suffer 
the same criticism as s.41. Thus, the proposition that the present law can only be remedied 
‘not by statutory revision but rather by additional guidelines’ is not accepted. 
 
An alternative legislative framework? 
The proposed legislative framework, below, incorporates good practice from the Scottish, 
New Zealand and Canadian rape shield statutes.149 The new framework would depart from 
the strict categories approach to sexual behaviour evidence adopted by s.41, but would 
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retain some of the important restrictions contained therein. The new provision aims to 
address the primary flaw with s.41, which is not the threshold at which sexual behaviour 
evidence is admitted, but rather s.41’s complexity of application in practice. The new 
provision would thus read as follows: 
 
1 Restrictions on evidence about the sexual behaviour and character of the 
complainant in sexual offence proceedings. 
(1) If at a trial a person is charged with a sexual offence,150 [no evidence can be given 
and no question can be put to a witness relating directly or indirectly to]151  
(a) [any sexual behaviour of the complainant];152 or 
(b) the character of the complainant (whether in relation to sexual matters or 
otherwise),153 
except with leave of the court. 
(2) The court may, on application made to it, admit such evidence or allow such 
questioning as is referred to in subsection (1) if: 
(a) the evidence or question relates to a specific instance (or instances) of the 
complainant’s sexual behaviour 154 [or to specific facts 155 demonstrating the 
complainant’s character] 156 and 
(b) exclusion of the evidence might have the effect of rendering unsafe a 
conclusion of the jury (or as the case may be) the court.157 
(3) In determining whether leave should be given under subsection (1), above, the 
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court must have regard to –  
(a) the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence 158 and 
(b) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual [...] offences. 159  
(4) Subject to the requirements of s.1(2)(a), the court may admit evidence to rebut or 
explain evidence under subsection (1) above [if the evidence or question, in the 
opinion of the court, would go no further than is necessary to enable the evidence 
adduced [...] to be rebutted or explained].160 
(5) [Where cross examination of a sexual offence complainant is allowed under this 
section, the court] 161  must, [notwithstanding the terms of its decision under 
subsection (1) above limit the extent of questioning to be allowed] 162 to that which is 
necessary to comply with the requirements imposed by s.1(2)(b) above. 
(6) No agreement between parties to criminal proceedings may render admissible 
[any evidence to be adduced or any question to be asked which cannot be adduced or 
asked apart from this section].163 
(7) [Nothing in this section authorises any evidence to be adduced or any question to 
be asked which cannot be adduced or asked apart from this section].164 
 
A “combined admissibility framework” for sexual behaviour and character evidence 
The legislative provisions proposed above would act as a combined admissibility framework, 
dealing both with the admissibility of sexual behaviour evidence and evidence of character 
in sexual offence proceedings. Under the new approach, s.100 of the 2003 Act would not 
apply to evidence or questioning concerning the bad character of sexual offence 
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complainants. Section 100 would have no application where the complainant’s character is 
in issue and, as currently provided for by s.41, ‘the person is charged with a sexual offence’. 
This would require an amendment to the bad character provisions of the 2003 Act. Section 
112 (3)(b) of the 2003 Act,165 which applies to s.41, would be repealed and a new subsection 
to s.100 would be inserted, which would provide that, 'nothing in this section authorises any 
evidence to be adduced or any question to be asked about the bad character of a witness 
where the witness is a sexual offence complainant in proceedings relating to that offence.' 
Section 100(3) of the 2003 Act, which identifies a number of factors that must be considered 
to assess the probative value of the evidence, such as the ‘nature and number of the events, 
or other things, to which the evidence relates’, and, ‘when those events or things are 
alleged to have happened or existed’ would have no application. This is because the ‘unsafe 
conclusion test’ adopted from s.41 would apply to both sexual behaviour evidence and 
character evidence, thereby providing an adequate safeguard by imposing a higher 
admissibility threshold than that imposed by s.100. The judge must not admit either type of 
evidence (sexual behaviour or character) unless refusing to do so might have the effect of 
rendering unsafe a conclusion of the jury. Restrictions on evidence relating to specific 
instances of sexual behaviour or character evidence,166 and the purpose for adducing that 
evidence,167 could be retained, and thereby reinforcing the position that the new approach 
would impose a higher test of admissibility. Along with strong adherence to the Criminal 
Procedure Rules168 and the Criminal Practice Direction,169 which provides more detailed 
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guidance to judges and advocates for adducing sexual behaviour evidence, this should assist 
in the prevention of direct and covert attacks on the complainant’s character that had long 
been an unfortunate feature in sexual offence proceedings. This approach to admitting 
evidence of the complainant’s sexual behaviour and character provides a more logical basis 
for admitting both types of evidence than that provided for at present which may require 
the interplay of s.41 and s.100.170 It would also remedy a potential problem which the court 
implicitly identified in R v V171 when it suggested that cross-examination about an allegedly 
false sexual allegation may require a ruling in relation to section 41 as well as leave 
under section 100.172 Under a revised version of s.41, the judge could give leave to admit 
some evidence of the complainant’s character, but refuse admission of false complaint or 
sexual behaviour evidence if it fails to satisfy other restrictions in s.41. Likewise, in the 
context of the complainant’s bad character, the exclusion of evidence concerning a previous 
false allegation or a previous conviction might not ‘render unsafe a conclusion of the jury’ if 
it amounted to an isolated episode which had occurred some years previously.  
 
Explanation of key provisions: 
Section 1(1): The exclusionary rule: sexual behaviour evidence and/or evidence to show 
that the complainant is ‘not of good character’ 
The exclusionary rule restricts both evidence of the complainant’s sexual behaviour and 
character. The wording ‘relating directly or indirectly’ is taken from the New Zealand rape 
shield,173 and is included to prevent covert attacks on the complainant’s character. Scottish 
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legislators were also mindful of subtle character attacks, and this is reflected in the use of 
very similar language in s.274 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. This places 
restrictions on evidence which ‘shows or tends to show that (a) the complainer is not of 
good character [...] or (b) has at any time, engaged in sexual behaviour not forming part of 
the subject matter of the charge.’ Scottish legislators were also mindful of such character 
attacks wherein complainants might be quizzed about their social habits such as whether 
they regularly take drugs, get drunk or visit nightclubs. For this reason, s.1(1) governs the 
admissibility of evidence concerning the complainant’s character ‘whether in relation to 
sexual matters or otherwise’. 
 
Sections 1(2)(a) and (b): retention of the ‘specific instance’ and ‘unsafe conclusion’ tests  
The new framework would import two key restrictions and safeguards contained in s.41 – 
the specific instance requirement in s.41(6), and also the s.41(2)(b) leave requirement that 
imposes a duty on the trial judge to permit evidence or questioning only when a refusal to 
do so ‘might have the result of rendering unsafe a conclusion of the jury or (as the case may 
be) the court on any relevant issue in the case’. In the case of the former, it would not be 
possible under the new statute to adduce evidence or ask questions about the general 
character of the complainant, whether in relation to sexual matters, or otherwise. For 
example, evidence that the complainant was promiscuous or engaged in prostitution would 
not be permitted unless, subject to other restrictions imposed by the statute, the accused 
could point to specific instances or facts about the complainant’s work as a prostitute.174 
This moves away from the previous approach taken to the ‘specific instance requirement’ 
imposed by s.41(6) of the 1999 Act in merely relating to the form of the evidence. The new 
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provision reflects the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in White in that the argument 
for admitting the evidence: 
only possesses intellectual coherence if it is taken to require that there must be 
something about the circumstances of a specific episode of alleged sexual conduct 
by a complainant which has potential probative force.175  
The mere fact that the complainant working as a prostitute would not be sufficient to meet 
the requirements of the subsection. However, evidence that the complainant and the 
defendant had engaged in certain fact specific activity, for example, role play involving rape 
fantasy and which were similar to the alleged facts of the facts giving rise to the current 
charge may satisfy the requirements of this section subject also to the application of the 
‘unsafe conclusion’ test.  
The addition of a ‘specific facts’ criterion does potentially allow for the adduction of 
evidence that would not otherwise satisfy the ‘specific instance requirement’. As Ward and 
Fouladvand identify in the context of White:  
Evidence that the complainants’ sex work in Hungary had been freely chosen would 
have probative force in rebutting their accounts of being trafficked to England 
against their will and compelled to work under the control of the defendants. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how such questions could be confined to specific 
instances of sexual behaviour, unless the defence were in a position to ask about 
individual clients.176 
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Despite this, the retention of the ‘unsafe conclusion’ test under s.41(2)(b) (and replicated at 
s.1(2)(b) (above)) prevents the admission of evidence used solely or mainly for the purposes 
of discrediting or undermining the complainant. The ‘unsafe conclusion’ test also imposes a 
higher hurdle in relation to bad character evidence than the enhanced relevance test in 
s.100 of the 2003 Act.  
Section 1(3): factors to be considered by the court 
 
The judge must direct his or her attention to two important factors contained in subsection 
(3) before leave can be given under s.1. The Canadian rape shield lists eight factors which 
the judge must consider when determining whether the evidence can be admitted.177 
Included here are the two most important factors which have troubled the courts for 
centuries, and which should be at the forefront of a judge’s mind when assessing relevance: 
(a) the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence; and (b) society’s interest in 
encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences.178  
Consideration might be given to the inclusion of a third criterion; whether the way in which 
the evidence was obtained is capable of undermining the probative value of that evidence. 
As was noted in earlier discussion a salient criticism arising from the Evans case was the way 
in which the evidence of previous sexual behaviour was obtained. In respect of defence 
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evidence the court cannot avail itself of an exclusionary discretion such as s.78 PACE 1984 or 
the ability to exclude defence evidence on abuse of process grounds. Requiring the court to 
consider the impact of the way evidence was obtained on the probative value of the 
evidence could go some way to addressing concerns about evidence obtained on the 
promise of a financial reward (as in the Evans case) or as a result of the type of “do-it-
yourself sleuthing”179 envisaged by Baird.  
Section 1(4): rebuttal evidence 
This relates to the admissibility of evidence in rebuttal of assertions made by either the 
defence or the prosecution. The leave requirements of the new provision would apply to both 
the prosecution and defence because, as noted by Temkin, sexual behaviour evidence can 
cause embarrassment to the complainant regardless of which party seeks its introduction. 180  
The rebuttal exception will apply to both. The wording of the rebuttal exception has 
essentially been adopted from s.41(5) of the 1999 Act, but specific reference is made to the 
requirement that the evidence must satisfy a ‘specific instance’ or ‘specific facts’ test and the 
‘unsafe’ conclusion test which is replicated in the proposed s.1(2).181 This requirement will 
guard against the admission of impermissible generalisations about the complainant’s sexual 
past or character, which should in any event be excluded by s.1(3). Under the new proposal, 
before evidence can pass through the rebuttal exception it would have to satisfy the 
cumulative leave requirements imposed by s.1(2).  
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Section 1(5): discretion to limit extent of questioning 
This would provide scope for the judge to limit questioning so as to protect complainants from 
prolonged and unnecessary cross-examination. This would reinforce existing good practice as 
time-limits can already be imposed on cross-examination of witnesses. 
 
Section 1(6): prohibition of agreed evidence between the parties 
 
It had been suggested that ‘the majority of section 41 applications are settled in a common-
sense way through negotiation and ultimately by agreement’.182 Concerns were raised by the 
Home Office Report that it was not uncommon for prosecution and defence counsel to agree 
between themselves to adduce sexual behaviour evidence which, in turn, could then be cross-
examined under s.41(5) by the defence.183 This could give rise to a situation wherein, if such 
“deals” are regularly being struck between counsel, then a provision which is designed to 
restrict sexual history evidence has the opposite effect by permitting more evidence via 
agreement between the parties. In doing so, this practice bypasses the safeguards contained 
within s.41 which would otherwise need to be satisfied before the evidence is heard. It is for 
this reason that s.1(6)184 of the proposed statute prohibits evidence or questioning which 
could otherwise have been smuggled into the court in consequence of prior agreement 
between the parties. 
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 Section 1(7): exclusive control of evidence relating to the bad character of sexual offence 
complainants 
Section 1(7) confirms the position that s.100 of the 2003 Act, which deals with the 
admissibility of evidence concerning the non-defendant’s bad character, does not apply to 
evidence or questioning concerning the bad character of sexual offence complainants. 
 
Conclusion  
The Evans case is both unusual and challenging in equal measure. The prosecution of a high 
profile defendant, the manner in which the evidence of the complainant’s sexual behaviour 
came to light and the deplorable treatment of the complainant (in particular via social media) 
was compounded by the media storm following the defendant’s successful appeal and 
subsequent acquittal. This complex factual background is precisely the reason that a 
dispassionate assessment of the effect of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Evans is imperative.  
In respect of the evidence of the complainant’s previous sexual behaviour, acknowledging the 
potential difficulties created by the way in which the evidence was gathered, the court, in 
possession of that evidence, was nevertheless faced with a series of clear questions. Was the 
evidence of the complainant’s previous sexual behaviour relevant to the issues of consent; 
was it sufficiently “similar” so as to pass though the gateway in s. 41(3)(c)(i) YJ&CEA 1999 (as 
read in the context of the decision of the House of Lords in R v A (No.2)), and, if so, would 
exclusion of the evidence have had the potential to render unsafe any conclusion of the jury? 
Alternatively, the court may have considered admitting the evidence on the basis that it was 
relevant to an issue other than consent, namely the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief, 
under s.41(3)(a) of the 1999 Act.  
To answer these questions consideration must be given to the purpose of the defence in 
seeking to adduce the evidence of the complainant’s previous sexual behaviour. No attempt 
was made by the defence to undermine the credibility of the complainant. In fact, this is a 
rare case in which the complainant offered no opposing account of what occurred; she simply 
had no memory of the incident in question. Absent a contrary narrative the jury were faced 
with a stark question; was the defendant telling the truth when he asserted that the 
complainant, “was perfectly capable of exercising her choice as to whether to engage in 
sexual activity and took the lead in most of what took place”,185  or did they accept the 
prosecution version of events that the complainant’s level of intoxication meant that she was, 
“incapable of behaving in that way” 186 ? Acknowledging the case of Dougal 187  in which 
evidence of the complainant’s lack of memory due to intoxication appears to have proved 
fatal to the prosecution, the complainant’s lack of memory could be seen as a somewhat 
damning piece of evidence against the defendant’s account that the complainant “was 
enthusiastic, awake and gave no indication that she was not capable of consenting.”188 That 
is, unless the jury were able to hear that, whilst in a similarly intoxicated state the complainant 
engaged in consensual sexual activity of which she retained no memory the next day. 
Criticisms have been levelled against the determination that the complainant’s behaviour (for 
example words of encouragement used and/or sexual positions adopted) were sufficiently 
similar so as to meet the requirements of s.41(3)(c)(i). However, as identified above, the level 
of similarity must be read in light of the decision of the House of Lords in R v A (No.2), and 
therefore, in a manner consistent with the defendant’s fair trial rights under Article 6 ECHR.189 
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An unusual aspect of the Evans case was that the evidence of previous sexual behaviour 
related to sexual activity with third parties rather than with the complainant. It is arguable 
that the veracity of Evans’ account was strengthened by corroborative third party evidence, 
of which he had no knowledge, when that account was offered. Given the specific peculiarities 
of the facts of the Evans case, including its position as one of Lord Steyn’s “rarest cases”190 in 
which evidence of sexual behaviour with a third party is relevant, it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that Evans was a case decided on its own facts, and which, therefore, sets no 
precedent, other than to provide a rare example of admissible third party sexual behaviour 
evidence.  
The review of cases involving applications to admit evidence of a complainant’s sexual 
behaviour conducted by the Attorney General’s Office and the Ministry of Justice and the 
acknowledgement that cases such as Mukadi,191 and latterly Evans, are “outliers” tend to 
suggest that s.41 YJ&CEA 1999 is operating as intended.  On that basis the Evans case does 
not appear to provide a sound basis on which to pursue legislative reform in this area. In 
addition, the newly implemented Practice Direction,192 which provides more detailed 
guidance to judges concerning decisions to admit sexual behaviour evidence - dispels the 
notion that such evidence will be easily admitted. This view is affirmed by research 
undertaken on behalf of the Criminal Bar Association, 193 the findings of which were highly 
critical of previous empirical studies on s.41’s application.194 The Report, which considered 
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Much of the damage to the public perception of how the criminal justice system deals with 
allegations of serious sexual offences in general, and with complainants specifically, arose not 
from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Evans, but from the reporting of it. The way in 
which the judgment was presented by some elements of the news media (including social 
media) lacked clarity, nuance and understanding, and likely achieved the opposite of what 
s.41 YJ&CEA 1999 was designed for; to encourage victims of sexual offences to come forward, 
and give evidence. Ensuring the accuracy of media narratives appears to be a consistent 
challenge in respect of sexual offence proceedings. This has again been highlighted by CPS, 
referring to the “serious inaccuracies” 196  in media reports about the use of complainant’s 
mobile phone data in sexual offence investigations.  
As established, the Evans decision does not appear to be representative of the normative 
operation of s.41. On the other hand, although the decision does not provide a rationale for 
wholesale reform of s.41, it serves a useful purpose by highlighting the practical difficulties of 
applying the legislation. It is the complexity of s.41 that is problematic rather than the 
standard at which sexual behaviour evidence is considered sufficiently relevant to warrant its 
admission, which, according to recent research, 197  is correct. The logical approach is to 
maintain the higher hurdle already provided by s.41, rather than to impose a lower threshold 
of admissibility as would result from the introduction of a model based on s.100 CJA 2003 as 
                                                          
has happened. None of them can be relied upon to reflect current practice in the courtrooms of England and 
Wales’; Hoyano (n 8) 46. 
195 Hoyano, (n 8). 
196 CPS, Handing over mobile phone data in rape prosecutions, <https://www.cps.gov.uk/cps/news/handing-
over-mobile-phone-data-rape-prosecutions> accessed 28th October 2019. 
197 Hoyano (n 8). 
proposed by Stark, but to simplify the operation of the legislative provisions in practice. This 
could be achieved by the enactment of a combined admissibility framework for both sexual 
behaviour and character evidence based on the proposals advanced herein.  
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